by Drew Corrigan (@Dcorrigan50)
The NBA is constantly changing. Whether it be the shifting of power between teams, or the evolution of a position, each year more and more marvel athletes enter the league and seemingly become tied down to a particular position, or role.
Perhaps it comes down to a coach just wanting to have his best five players on the court at all times, or maybe it’s the emergence of analytics that has the game changing for the better. For example: in today’s NBA, teams are attempting more three-pointers en route to scoring more points than fans have ever seen.
Players like Kevin Love and Dirk Nowitzki, although rare, once-in-a-blue-moon talents, are labeled stretch-4s and possess the jumpshooting ability comparable to league’s best shooting guards. These are perennial matchup nightmares posing as matchup nightmares when implemented within an offense, as they force larger, more-limited forwards away from where they’re comfortable in the area around the basket. Instead of searching for a traditional power forward, teams are digging through international basketball gold mines for these colossal men that can stretch the floor the same way a guard can.
Current example of an evolving backcourt: Eric Bledsoe and Goran Dragic of the Phoenix Suns. Essentially, the Suns used two point guards throughout the 2013-2014 season [when both players were healthy], and according to the box scores, Dragic was dubbed the shooting guard, but only due to the technicality of the label. Phoenix virtually presents two, natural point guards on the floor as both Dragic and Bledsoe have spent the bulk of their careers as their team’s primary facilitator — Dragic’s time as a role player not withstanding
By doing this, the Suns have a few advantages but there are also caveats when using a two PG lineup. For instance, two ball handlers on the floor allows for more efficient use of the most common play in basketball — the pick-and-roll. Natural PG’s [with a few exemptions, of course] are sometimes liabilities on defense, too.
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According to 82games.com, the Suns’ second most used lineup this season was: Bledsoe-Dragic-P.J.Tucker-Channing Frye-Miles [NAME THAT] Plumlee. This two PG lineup accompanied by a stretch-four [Frye] scored 1.08 points per 100 possessions while giving up only 0.96 points per 100 possession on defense. This is the only lineup in Phoenix’s top 10 most used that gave up less than 1.00 PPP on defense.
These five players also produced a +/- of 116, which is wicked, while going 22-13 equating into a 62.8 win percentage when on the floor together. Bledsoe and Dragic, playing on the floor at the same time, alongside Frye, headed the Suns’ best lineup throughout the season. This explains why Jeff Hornacek went with this group for 435.8 minutes this year.
The Suns most-used lineup did sacrifice offensive potency in exchange for defensive tenacity, nor was it the other way around.
Take a look at this play from a Suns game this season. You will see how having two point guards on the floor benefits the Suns tremendously.
Dragic attempts to create something, but the defense collapses on him in the paint. He uses his point guard instincts to pass the ball to Channing Frye, who hands the ball to Bledsoe. Now, the Suns have another opportunity to create a scoring opportunity after Dragic failed.
With Bledsoe now having the ball in his hands, the Phoenix Suns are still in great position to score. Bledsoe, a point guard, can have the same effect that Dragic has with the ball in his hands. He’s not a prototypical, one-dimensional two guard; he has the ability to create his own shot. Immediately, Bledsoe starts the P-n-R with Plumlee.
Bledsoe uses the P-n-R to blow right by David Lee and straight to the rim for two points.
Now, David Lee is a horrid defender, but this still shows how advantageous it was for Phoenix to have two point guards on the floor in this instance. As soon as Dragic noticed the play was dead, he kicked it to Frye, who put the ball in another creator in Bledsoe. In a traditional offense, the play would be dead as soon as Dragic passed the ball out, because of the lack of people on the floor who can create scoring opportunities through the P-n-R.
I also took a look into some other two point guard lineups used this season. Most notably, Reggie Jackson and Russell Westbrook. This is different from Phoenix, because these two aren’t the same players. No one is as explosive as Russell Westbrook, so it’s almost impossible to throw two players of that nature on the floor.
Take, for instance, the Thunder’s Westbrook-Jackson-Thabo Sefolosha-Kevin Durant-Serge Ibaka lineup. These five were one of OKC’s most successful lineups this season. It scored 1.27 PPP while giving up only 0.82 PPP; it was +50 and produced a 12-3 record for OKC which is an 80 percent win percentage. With Westbrook only playing in less than 50 games this season, it reduced how much this lineup could be used, but it’s obvious how effective it was.
Both Westbrook and Reggie Jackson shot less than 35 percent from deep, so the two point guard lineup doesn’t necessarily have to have two, deadeye shooters. Simply playing two guards who can create, handle and facilitate just causes more problems for opposing defenses trying to figure out what to do to stop the dynamic two PG lineup.
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During the playoffs, there was an excruciating amount of discussion of John Wall and Bradley Beal as one of the best backcourts in the NBA.
To be fair, the mixture of Wall and Beal is one of the better up-and-coming backcourts in the league. Obviously, John Wall is a natural point guard and Bradley Beal is the three-point specialist at the two-guard spot. The combination of Wall and Beal is lethal, but how does it stack up in the P-n-R against Dragic and Bledsoe?
Note that John Wall uses the P-n-R 41.1 percent of the time, which is more than Goran Dragic. However, Wall is less efficient in the P-n-R, as he scores 0.90 PPP, which is 60th in the NBA. Wall shot a shabby 38.6 percent from the field and 32 percent from three-point land. His partner, Bradley Beal, used the P-n-R for 25.5 percent of his offense. Beal only produced 0.75 PPP in the P-n-R, while shooting 40.4 percent on FG’s and 37.5 percent on his trey balls.
Eric Bledsoe and Goran Dragic played together for 884 minutes this season, while outscoring their opponent by 10.1 points, which was the biggest difference on the Suns roster. Individually, the data shows that both players excelled in the P-n-R.
Goran Dragic scored 0.98 PPP in the P-n-R as the main ball handler, which was ninth in the NBA. The P-n-R was The Dragon’s fire as he used is 37.8 percent of the time on offense, while shooting 51.5 percent from the field and 43.4 percent from three in these situations.
Conversely, Bledsoe was the ball handler in the P-n-R 37.9 percent of the time while putting up 0.85 PPP, which ranked 51th in the NBA. The explosive guard shot 42.8 percent on field goals and 41 percent from deep. Dragic was the more successful of the two in the P-n-R, but the combination of both is scary.
Eric Bledsoe only played in 43 games this season due to his meniscus injury, which limited how often The Dragon and Mini-LeBron could be used together. Wall and Beal played over 1918 minutes together this season and combined to outscore their opponent by an average margin of 2.3 points per game. Even with the difference in minutes, it’s hard to ignore the fact that Phoenix’s backcourt outscored the opposition by 10.1 points per game. The Suns finished with a 48-34 record, which placed them in the ninth seed in the West, while the Wizards finished 44-38, good enough for fifth in the East. I won’t get into the problem with the conferences, however, were Wall and Beal more impactful than Dragic and Bledsoe? I think not.
Basically, what we have here is a comparison between the ubiquitous traditional backcourt that has overran the NBA for decades upon decades and the backcourt of the future. The information has been presented and seems to favor the backcourt of the future, even though it’s highly unlikely that the NBA will ever be dominated by two point guard setups. The NBA is all about options and these findings are proving that there are more options than the traditional point guard and shooting guard backcourt. It’s more of the evolution of the athlete becoming more powerful and unique that is pressing the boundaries of placed in stone position by position rankings on a basketball court. The more options that an offense has to throw on a court will make it harder for the defense to stop. The game of basketball is all about buckets; always has and always will be. The point guard backcourt may not overtake the NBA, but it certainly has its place, and teams like Phoenix have used it very successfully.
Now, let’s throw in a traditional setup used by the Dallas Mavericks, who featured Jose Calderon and Monta Ellis at the point guard and shooting guard positions. Jose Calderon is a natural point guard and Monta Ellis is a prototypical shooting guard that enjoys scoring. The Mavs’ most used lineup consisted of: Calderon-Ellis-Shawn Marion-Nowitzki-Samuel Dalembert. These five players produced 1.10 PPP on offense while giving up 1.10 PPP on defense in the 844.2 minutes that it was used this season. The lineup manifested a +/- of three, while having a 28-33 win loss record which equals a 45.9 win percentage. This pales in comparison to the lineup used by the Suns, which produced 1.08 PPP on offense, while giving up 0.96 PPP on defense. It appears that putting two point guards on the floor can impact the defensive side of the ball as well.
The Mavericks had the 20th ranked defense last season, compared to the Suns who had the 21st ranked defense. Neither defenses were great, but the Suns were on another level when they instituted a two point guard lineup, both offensively and defensively. While defense embodies all players on the floor, the guards are the first line of defense as they guard the person bringing the ball up. Goran Dragic averaged 1.4 steals and Eric Bledsoe averaged 1.6 steals this season, compared to 1.7 for Monta Ellis and 0.9 for Jose Calderon.
With a lot of these traditional lineups, it’s common that one player will be better at something than the other player. However, in Phoenix specifically, there are two players who complement each other perfectly. For the Mavericks, Monta Ellis is a threat to steal the ball, but not so much for Calderon. The difference between the two pairs are 0.4 steals per game, which doesn’t appear like a lot at first.
Consider that defenses have to account for Dragic and Bledsoe stealing their cookies at the same time, which doesn’t happen often in Dallas. Having two guards being able to steal the ball makes defense clench up and think about every dribble or pass more than they normally would. This game is just as mental as physical, and the role of the point guards definitely plays a role in that.
For example, let’s take a look at Game 7 of the first-round of the Western Conference Playoffs, where the Dallas Mavericks faced the San Antonio Spurs. The Spurs won this game by 23 points, blowing out the Mavs and their playoffs hopes. The bulk of the scoring by the Spurs was done by Tony Parker, Danny Green and Manu Ginobili — all players that were guarded by either Monta Ellis or Jose Calderon. Parker ripped the Mavs backcourt for 32 points, while Ginobili tallied 20 points and Green dropped in 16 — the three leading scorers for the Spurs that game. It’s no coincidence that these three were being guarded by a combination of Calderon and Monta Ellis.
I also took a look at a March 7th matchup for the Mavs against the Golden State Warriors, in which the Mavericks lost 108-85. In this game, Stephen Curry dropped 10 points, Klay Thompson scored 14, while Jordan Crawford blazed the Mavs poor backcourt defense for 19 points on 8-of-12 shooting. The common occurrence in a lot of the Mavericks blowouts from this season is that the bulk of the scoring comes from the backcourt of the opposing team. Obviously even an average team can defeat the best defense on any given night, but the trend for the Mavericks tended to support a lackluster backcourt defense when being blown out.
It’s hard to find a concrete statistic that points out bad defense, which is why these box scores are being looked at. Jose Calderon is known for being a bad defender, due to his poor lateral movement. Not being quick laterally equals not being able to stay infront of anyone and the inability to do anything once the offensive player blows by Calderon. He can almost depict a traffic cone at times.
On the other hand, Monta Ellis is guilty of being lost on defense and more apparent to making defensive mistakes than anything to do with his general quickness. Mistakes such as ball watching and not paying attention, something James Harden has caught wreck for over the past season.
Take this as the point and case for Monta Ellis’ defense. He begins the play guarding Steph Curry as the pick is being set.
After the pick is set, Ellis loses all interest in guarding Curry as he continues to watch the ball instead of his man. Curry finds his way to the three-point line with Ellis hovering around the free-throw line. Curry rises up and you know the result: swish.
Monta Ellis is prone to defensive lapses like these, which is why the combination of Ellis and Calderon in the backcourt can be treacherous for the Mavs defense. If Monta Ellis falls into a lapse on defensive, Jose Calderon sure as hell isn’t recovering in time to pick up Ellis’ man.
Goran Dragic and Eric Bledsoe are ballhawks on the defensive end and can pickup where each other make mistakes due to their quickness and effort to actually play aggressive defense. This quote from Thunder head coach Scottie Brooks speaks about how deadly the combination is on both ends of the court and their aggresive nature on defense: “Both guys’ ability to catch and shoot, catch and drive, penetrate. They’re both good playmakers, too. And they’re aggressive on the defensive end. It’s problematic.” A lot of defensive lapses in the NBA come from players just not caring or realizing whats going on in the moment, Dragic and Bledsoe don’t suffer from these lapses as frequently as others, which is why the combination of the two works on both ends of the court.
Let’s now look at the backcourt of Damian Lillard and Wesley Matthews as another young up-and-coming fusion of talent. The two played 2201 minutes together this season, outscoring opponents by 5.2 points. Damian Lillard is one of the better P-n-R players in the NBA, ranking 26th and producing a 0.89 PPP. Wes Matthews, who’s known for his shooting more than anything, only works in the P-n-R 8.8 percent of the time while putting together 0.74 PPP (126th in the NBA). Lillard’s excellent P-n-R ability keeps the two afloat, but Dragic (9th in P-n-R) and Bledsoe (51st in P-n-R) are more dominant when fused together.
Placing two guards on the floor that can excel in the pick and roll provides a lethal injection of offense for a squad. At literally any point in an offensive possession, a team has two players on the floor that are serious threats to pick apart a team through a P-n-R. Reasons like these are why a two point guard system can work. It literally gives an offense more lives, it’s a second chance at a scoring opportunity. The pictures above perfectly explain why it’s so lethal and why Phoenix was so successful when using it.
It will take time to show if the Phoenix Suns’ backcourt is a fad or the blueprint for changing the landscape of the NBA. The Utah Jazz are toying with putting together a backcourt of two guards, is this a smart thing to do?
Neither Trey Burke or Dante Exum are heralded as great shooters. Burke shot 38 percent from the floor and 33 percent from deep this season. One of the reasons that the Dragic and Bledsoe duo was so successful this season, was because both can knock it down from deep — Dragic shot 41 percent from three-point range and Bledsoe shot 36 percent this season. Not to mention, Dragic’s 41 percent was a career-high, which happened to be his first season playing alongside Bledsoe. Eric Bledsoe improved his shooting from 10-16 feet to 42 percent after shooting 35 percent the previous season. Also, Bledsoe improved from 16-feet and beyond by shooting 39 percent this season compared to 28 percent the previous season. It’s obvious that planting the two next to each other allowed each to improve substantially in the shooting category.
In addition to shooting the long ball, both Dragic and Bledsoe can facilitate and score from the inside and outside. Having two guards who are effective in the P-n-R allows their skill-sets to seamlessly work off of each other, while giving them two options to start their offense with. If Dragic can’t find anything, he can create and flip it to Bledsoe who is another killer in multiple ways on the floor.
Not to mention, Dragic and Bledsoe were the two best guards on the roster, regardless of position, so it made sense to toss them both out there, because it’s coming to a point where you have to put your best five players on the floor at any given time. This is the same reason we’ve seen LeBron James play every position on the court, because him being on the court gives the Heat the best chance to win. Just like having Dragic and Bledsoe on the court together has the same effect
Obviously, there’s a lot of question marks about Exum’s shooting. This report on Basketball Insiders had the following to say about Exum’s shooting ability: Exum’s jump shot has been discussed as his primary weakness, but he has worked diligently to increase his arc, and his form is just fine. He has no problem pulling up from the FIBA three-point line or rising up on balance going either direction. Although he did not shoot well in many of the games I saw, given his form and how comfortable he looks shooting I think his jumper can become an adequate weapon sooner than a lot of people think.
It’s important to know that players can acquire a jumper during a career, especially from deep. Jason Kidd shot 27 percent from three in his first season in the NBA and increased to 34 and 37 percent his second and third seasons. Over his 21-year career, Kidd only shot under 30 percent from three in his first and seventh season. He also tallied nine seasons of shooting 36 percent or better from beyond-the-arc.
It’s understandable that 36 percent isn’t Steph Curry esque, but that’s not the point. It’s developing a good enough jumper to force defenders to guard you at the three-point line. Someone shooting 30 percent from deep is going to be allowed to fire jumpers all day; you can’t say the same about someone who shoots 36 percent.
Trey Burke didn’t shoot a good percentage from three in his rookie season, but there’s no reason why he cant increase that to a respectable 36 or 37 percent in his sophomore campaign similar to Kidd. No one has any idea what Exum’s jumper is going to do when he comes to the NBA, but the same can be said for him.
Besides just Trey Burke and Dante Exum, the point is that there’s no reason why two point guards can’t have cohesion in the same backcourt. As the NBA keeps evolving, this might be something that keeps recurring. Especially with the shooting guard position becoming less and less valuable, while marquee point guards are becoming abundant. Long gone are the days of shooting guards just being able to score and point guards being constricted to whipping beautiful passes to leaking players. The evolution of the basketball player in general has allowed several positions in the NBA to evolve. Evolution is unstoppable and basketball is proof of that. We’ve seen it with the stretch forward position and the fact that teams value a big man that can stretch the floor more than a center who has post skills. The point guard position is just beginning to evolve, but it could be a short few seasons before Charmander evolves fully into Charizard.
